

STATINTL

One Thing Is Learned

One thing is clearly ascertained by a perusal of the Pentagon study, about the publication of which so much controversy has arisen.

That thing is the perceptive level of performance of the Central Intelligence Agency as to Indochina in the 1964-forward period in which American involvement in Vietnam was mushrooming.

The CIA clearly "read" very well the indications of what might develop in Indochina as the American commitment was extended.

In specifics, the CIA rejected the domino theory — that if South Vietnam fell, there would also topple Laos, then Cambodia, then other Asian states, like a falling row of dominoes. The CIA saw only limited damage to American interests from a Red victory in South Vietnam. This still could have been a faulty conclusion but the intelligence on which it was based was sound.

Again in specifics, the CIA expected — and rightly — little impact on the war potential of North Vietnam through restricted bombing. It did not believe North Vietnam would be intimidated by the possible loss of its minuscule in-

dustrial complex — it had the Soviet Union and Red China on which to rely. Its own production was a drop in the bucket measured against the outpouring of martial and industrial aid from the Big Reds.

Most of the strategic conclusions made by the CIA were rejected by the policy makers and the rejection was ratified by action of then President Johnson. This included the CIA dissent to commitment of U.S. forces to offensive combat operations without any change in the limited tempo of bombing operations being conducted. An April, 1965, memo from the CIA director, John A. McCone, put the dissent this way: In effect if the planned ground operation goes in motion we will find ourselves mired down in combat in the jungle in a military effort that we cannot win and from which we will have extreme difficulty extricating ourselves."

Hindsight being 20-20 invariably, one could wish that Mr. McCone might have been a little more persuasive with Mr. Johnson and those to whom the then president did listen.

Games Presidents and Other People Play Pentagon Papers

by Eugene J. McCarthy

The overall effect of the publication of the Pentagon Papers is as yet somewhat unclear. There is no question, however, but that their publication has damaged the reputation of some officeholders - past and present - and that it has added to the growing distrust on the part of the Congress and of the people of the country in the official statements of policy and program by the executive branch of the government.

The papers published have not revealed very much that was altogether new or different. Nevertheless, what they have shown is highly significant.

They have shown first that the executive branch, acting and speaking principally through the presidency and the State Department and the Pentagon, has been more devious and more deceptive than was suspected. And it was suspected very greatly - especially by members of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, which has been at least since 1965 asserting without much success the right of the Congress and of the country to accurate information as to our policies in Vietnam and as to the realities of the war.

The difference is quantitative rather than qualitative, relative rather than absolute, but it is a significant difference. The papers show, for example, that the misrepresentations surrounding the preparation and the presentation to the Congress in 1964 of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution were more carefully programmed and directed, more calculated even than was revealed by the Senate inquiry on that incident in 1968. It seems quite clear now that there was a connection between the United States destroyers patrolling in the Tonkin Gulf and action in South Vietnam, although this connection was denied by Secretary McNamara in an appearance before the Senate Committee. And also that the captains of the United States destroyers knew that the South Vietnamese were conducting naval raids, although this was not admitted at the time of the inquiry.

The papers show that the administration was much more ready to mislead the people of the country by withholding information, by telling only half-truths and, in some cases, by positive misrepresentation. And that this was the case not just between elections - when considerations of strategy might justify a

measure of secrecy - but true in the election years of 1964 and 1968, the time when the people had every right to a full knowledge of not just what the government was doing in Vietnam but what it believed it might have to do, what it planned to do even on a contingency basis.

When President Johnson in August of 1964 said he was not going to load our planes with bombs, or enlarge the war, or send American boys to fight in Asia, he should have said that he hoped he would not have to do any of these things and added, as was the case, that there were contingency plans under consideration which, if certain conditions developed in the war in Vietnam, might have to be brought into effect, and that these plans included bombing and also the use of American troops.

And again in July of 1965, when the President was asked whether sending troops to Vietnam implied a change in existing policy, he said it did not, when it clearly did imply a change in what, at least at that time, was a declared public policy of the United States government.

The papers expose even more callous misrepresentations and manipulation in showing, for example, that within the administration the bombing halts were generally not taken as actions toward ending the war, but rather as calculated to give grounds for arguing that the enemy had not responded to peaceful overtures and that consequently the critics of the war would be put in a more difficult position, if not silenced, and that a propaganda basis for an escalation of the war would be established.

The papers show that the measure of self-confidence and of arrogance on the part of men like Walt Rostow, Robert McNamara, and McGeorge Bundy was greater than it was generally believed to be. Here is a quotation from McGeorge Bundy on the question of the overthrow of Diem taken from a note sent to Ambassador Lodge: "Once a coup under responsible leadership has begun, and within these restrictions, it is in the interest of the US Government that it should succeed."

Or an earlier one from William P. Bundy in 1961; CIA-RDP80-01601R000300360100-2 that present and aggressive US action could clean up the situation

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Data Denied McNamara, Ellsberg Says

By ROBERT M. SMITH
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 9 — Daniel Ellsberg asserted today that Pentagon officials working for the Joint Chiefs of Staff kept from Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara the existence of a study of the 1964 Tonkin Gulf incident.

Dr. Ellsberg, who has been indicted on charges of unauthorized possession of secret documents in the Pentagon papers case, said that the Defense Department officials "definitely and deliberately withheld it from the Secretary of Defense until Fulbright raised the question.

"The reason they were so jealous of it," said Dr. Ellsberg, "was they did not want the Secretary of Defense to know they had certain data—tapes of the Secretary's conversations with joint and subordinate commanders overseas. [They] Didn't want it known their file of CIA messages was so complete."

Mr. McNamara, now president of the World Bank, was called for comment on Dr. Ells-

berg's assertion but did not return the call.

Dr. Ellsberg, a 40-year-old senior research associate at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, made his remarks to a small group of reporters at a breakfast meeting here.

He said that he had been a consultant to the Pentagon in 1968 when the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held its hearings on the Tonkin incident. The North Vietnamese were reported to have attacked American destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin in August, 1964, and Congress had responded with a resolution giving its approval to "all necessary steps" taken by the President to repel "further aggression" in Southeast Asia.

"I remember the flap raised" by Senator Fulbright's request, Dr. Ellsberg said. The transcript of the hearings on Feb. 20, 1968, show that Senator Fulbright said he had asked the pentagon for its "command and control documents."

In his response, Mr. McNamara said that he had "never

hear of the study when you requested it. General Wheeler [Earle G. Wheeler, chairman of the Joint Chiefs] was not aware of it."

High Official Cited

Mr. McNamara told the committee that "the author of this particular study did not have access" to all the appropriate information and that he did not "think you want evaluative reports sent over here that are incomplete."

Dr. Ellsberg said that he was told by "a very high official" on the operations staff of the Joint Chiefs that the study was regarded as "sensitive" because it used tapes of Mr. McNamara's conversations through the war room to commanders, including Admiral U. S. Grant Sharp, Commander of Pacific Forces.

Dr. Ellsberg, who has said that he gave the Pentagon papers "to the American people through the press," today added that "there was at least one other source" of the documents to one newspaper. He named neither the source nor the newspaper.

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JUL 10 1971

Aims To 'Embarass' US

CIA Takes Dim View Of Viet Cong

Peace Plan

WASHINGTON -- The Central Intelligence Agency has told President Nixon that the new Viet Cong peace proposal is aimed at embarrassing the United States "both at home and overseas" and encouraging the opponents of President Nguyen Van Thieu in South Vietnam.

Other negative comments on the plan were contained in a detailed analysis submitted to Nixon and other top administration officials last Friday, a day after Mrs. Nguyen Thi Binh, the chief Viet Cong delegate, offered her proposal at the Paris talks.

Top Level Studies

The agency's evaluation, according to senior administration officials, was one of several top level studies of the Communist plan on which Nixon and Secretary of State William P. Rogers based their decision to instruct the United States delegation in Paris to seek further clarifications today from the Communist side in "restricted sessions," or private talks.

The evaluation as well as the parallel studies prepared in recent days by the State and Defense Departments and National Security Council staff have expressed numerous serious reservations about the Viet Cong plan.

But all the studies also found new elements in the plan. The CIA paper, for example, noted that "it softens" the Communist position on the American prisoners of war and presents "two new nuances" on the South Vietnamese political settlement. For this reason, senior officials said, the administration chose to seek to engage in what officials here termed "meaningful negotiations."

Senior officials emphasized that they did not consider the fact that the Communists had not responded immediately to the proposal for "restricted" sessions, made Thursday in

Paris by David K. E. Bruce, the chief United States negotiator, as an outright rejection. They said that "something resembling a negotiating process may be in the making."

Efforts By Bruce

At San Clemente, Calif., where Nixon and Rogers conferred for the third time this week on strategy in the Paris talks, a White House spokesman, Gerald L. Warren, said that Bruce was attempting to start "meaningful negotiations."

"At this stage, we are not prepared to reject or to accept anything as a package," a senior official said. "We are looking and we are probing because this is the business of diplomacy."

Other officials said that the negotiating situation would be reviewed again tomorrow when Henry A. Kissinger joins Nixon and Rogers in San Clemente. The next scheduled session of the Paris talks is next Thursday.

Officials familiar with various administration evaluations of the Viet

Cong plan said that the CIA analysis was "perhaps the most pessimistic -- but also the most realistic -- of the lot."

CIA Conclusion

Its over-all conclusion, contained in the first paragraph of the document, said:

"The Viet Cong's new seven-point proposal softens the Communists' position on the prisoner-of-war release but retains and amplifies a very tough line on United States disengagement from the war. In addition, it repackages Hanoi's demands for a political settlement in South Vietnam in a superficially more attractive form."

The analysis recognized, however, that "there are two new nuances in the Communist position on a political settlement in South Vietn."

The analysis said that the Viet Cong plan's first "new nuance" was that instead of demanding a coalition regime in Hanoi, it "simply demands that the United States 'cease backing the belligerent group' headed by Thieu."

The other nuance, it said, is that the Communists no longer ask a "three-segment" regime, including Communists, but a broad "government of national concord" to be negotiated by the Viet Cong with a "post-Thieu administration."